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Abstract
We consider the optimal dividend problem under a habit-formation constraint that prevents
the dividend rate to fall below a certain proportion of its historical maximum, a so-called draw-
down constraint. Our problem is an extension of Duesenberry’s optimal-consumption problem
under a ratcheting constraint, studied by Dybvig (1995), in which consumption is restrained
to be nondecreasing. Our problem also differs from Dybvig’s in that the time of ruin could be
finite in our setting, whereas ruin is impossible in Dybvig’s work. We formulate our problem as
a stochastic control problem with the objective of maximizing the expected discounted utility of
the dividend stream until bankruptcy, in which risk preferences are embodied by power utility.
We write the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman variational inequality as a nonlinear, free-
boundary problem and solve it semi-explicitly via the Legendre transform. The optimal (excess)
dividend rate c∗t - as a function of the company’s current surplus Xt and its historical running
maximum of the (excess) dividend rate zt - is as follows: There are constants 0 < wα < w1 < w∗
such that (1) for 0 < Xt ≤ wαzt , it is optimal to pay dividends at the lowest rate αzt , (2) for
wαzt < Xt < w1zt , it is optimal to distribute dividends at an intermediate rate c∗t ∈ (αzt , zt), (3)
for w1zt < Xt < w∗zt , it is optimal to distribute dividends at the historical peak rate zt , (4) for
Xt > w∗zt , it is optimal to increase the dividend rate above zt , and (5) it is optimal to increase
zt via singular control as needed to keep Xt ≤ w∗zt . Because, the maximum (excess) dividend
rate will eventually be proportional to the running maximum of the surplus, “mountains will
have to move” before we increase the dividend rate beyond its historical maximum.
Keywords: Optimal dividend, drawdown constraint, ratcheting, stochastic control, optimal
control, variational inequality, free-boundary problem.
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1 Introduction
One of the fundamental goals of risk managers is to improve the stability of companies that operate
in risky environments. This goal can be reached through the choice of the dividend policy, that
is, how much of a company’s surplus to pay out (or, equivalently, retain). There is a tradeoff
embedded in this decision. Paying out more dividends would increase a company’s worth in the
eyes of its shareholders, while doing so would also reduce future reserves that are essential for the
survival of the company through financial hardships. Since the seminal work of De Finetti (1957),
there has been an active area of research devoted to finding optimal payment of dividends under
various criteria.
Shareholders and analysts react negatively (and arguably overreact) when the rate of dividend
payment decreases. The existing literature on optimal dividend policies, however, mainly ignores
shareholder’s averseness to decreases in dividend payments. Our main goal in this paper is to
address this issue by considering a so-called drawdown constraint on the rate of dividend payments,
that is, we demand that the future rate of dividend payments cannot go below a fixed proportion
of the historical maximum of the dividend rate to date. Interestingly, we find that the running
maximum of the optimal dividend rate is (eventually) proportional to the running maximum of the
surplus process. In other words, “mountains will have to move” before increasing the dividend rate
beyond it historical peak.
Many of the existing results in optimal dividends show that to maximize the expected discounted
dividends until bankruptcy, it is optimal to pay dividends according to a band strategy or its special
case of a barrier strategy; see Avanzi (2009) for a survey. For example, Asmussen and Taksar
(1997) consider the optimal dividend strategy for an insurance company whose surplus process
follows Brownian motion with drift. They assume that the insurer pays dividends to maximize the
expectation of discounted dividends paid between now and ruin, and they consider two cases. In
the first case, Asmussen and Taksar (1997) constrain the dividend rate to lie in an interval [0, C0].
If C0 is less than or equal to a critical value C∗, then it is optimal to pay dividends at the rate
C0 at all levels of the surplus. If C0 > C∗, then it is optimal to pay dividends at rate 0 if surplus
is lower than some value X∗ and at rate C0 if surplus is greater than X∗. In the second case,
Asmussen and Taksar (1997) do not restrict the rate of dividend payments, and it is optimal to pay
dividends via a barrier strategy, under which all the surplus in excess of a barrier b are paid out
as dividends. Also, see Asmussen et al. (2000) for an extension of Asmussen and Taksar (1997) in
which the authors allow the insurer to control its surplus via reinsurance. Finally, see Gerber and
Shiu (2006) for explicit calculations related to Asmussen and Taksar (1997).
Note that paying dividends at rate C0 if surplus is greater than X∗ and at rate 0 if surplus is less
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than X∗ results in a volatile all-or-nothing path. Incorporating habit formation is a way to smooth
the rate of dividend payments; see Constantinides (1990) for seminal work in habit formation.
We model habit formation via a drawdown constraint on the rate of excess dividend payments;
by “excess” we mean in excess of the interest paid if the surplus were invested completely at the
riskless rate of return. We require that the rate of excess dividend payments never falls below some
given fraction of the historical maximum rate of excess dividend payments. This requirement is in
contrast to most drawdown constraints in the literature. Specifically, most drawdown constraints
apply to the surplus or wealth, not to rates of payout or consumption; see, for example, Grossman
and Zhou (1993), Cvitanić and Karatzas (1995), and Elie and Touzi (2008).
That said, there are two important papers that do impose drawdown constraints on consump-
tion. The first is Dybvig (1995), who imposes a ratcheting constraint on the rate of consumption
and finds the optimal investment and consumption policies for an investor in a Black-Scholes fi-
nancial market who seeks to maximize discounted utility of consumption, in which risk preferences
exhibit constant relative risk aversion, as we assume in this paper. The second is Arun (2012), who
extends Dybvig (1995) by allowing the rate of consumption to decrease, but not below a fraction
of its maximum rate. This constraint is identical to the drawdown constraint that we apply to the
excess dividend rate. What distinguishes our work from Dybvig (1995) and Arun (2012) is that
we do not impose the additional requirement that wealth remain non-negative; instead, we allow
bankruptcy, which occurs with positive probability, and which more closely follows the dividend
models used in the literature (see, for example, Gerber and Shiu (2004)). We further discuss the
difference between our work and theirs in Remark 2.2.
Albrecher et al. (2018) study a problem related to the one considered by Dybvig (1995), except
they allow a one-time only increase in the dividend rate. They pre-specify the two dividend rates
and determine the optimal level of surplus above which the company pays out at the higher rate.
On the other hand, we allow the dividend rate to increase without restriction, other than it may
not drop below a fixed proportion of its historical maximum. Therefore, our work is much more
general than that of Albrecher et al. (2018).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define our optimal dividend
problem. In Section 3, we hypothesize that the value function is a solution of a free-boundary
problem with free-boundary conditions arising from smooth-fit and super-contact conditions and
with two state variables. In Section 3.1, we reduce the dimension of our free-boundary problem
from two state variables to one and use the convex Legendre transform to solve the dual of the
resulting free-boundary problem; then, in Section 3.2, we reverse the Legendre transform to obtain
our value function. In Section 4, we prove further properties of the optimal investment and dividend
policies, and we consider limiting cases of our problem. In Sections 3 and 4, we also present some
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numerical examples to demonstrate our results. Appendix A provides the verification argument for
our stochastic control problem, namely, that the solution of the free-boundary problem obtained
in Section 3 is the value function.
2 Preliminary definitions and the problem setup
Consider a company that has to decide on its investment and dividend policies. For simplicity, we
assume that the number of shares of the company is fixed. Thus, its investment policy is dictated
by its debt policy, that is, how much bond it issues or buys back. The bonds are issued at a fixed
interest rate r ≥ 0. We represent the investment policy via the value of the total assets of the
company at time t, denoted by pit . We assume that the company can instantly increase its total
assets by issuing bonds and buying new assets. Similarly, it can instantly reduce its total assets by
selling existing assets and using the proceeds to buy back its bonds.
The company also chooses how to pay dividends to its shareholders. Let Ct denote the rate at
which the company pays dividends at time t; therefore, the total amount of dividends paid over
[t, t + ε] is
∫ t+ε
t Cudu.
We assume that the company is subject to two constraints when devising its dividend policy.
First, shareholders expect a risk premium for investing in the firm. Therefore, the dividend rate
must be at least as high as the interest rate, that is, Ct ≥ rXt for all t ≥ 0, in which Xt is the
company’s surplus at time t. We denote the excess dividend rate by
ct = Ct – rXt ; t ≥ 0.
Second, because shareholders and analysts react negatively (and arguably overreact) when the
rate of dividend payment decreases, we assume that the excess dividend rate cannot go below a
fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of its past maximum, a so-called drawdown constraint on the excess dividend
rate. Specifically, we impose the drawdown constraint
ct ≥ αzt , P-almost surely; t ≥ 0, (2.1)
in which (zt)t≥0 is the historical peak of the dividend process, given by
zt = max
{
z, sup
0≤s<t
cs
}
. (2.2)
Here, the constant z > 0 represents the historical maximum of the excess dividend rate strictly
before time 0 and is included so that the problem has a financial past. In particular, the drawdown
constraint yields
ct ≥ αzt ≥ αz > 0 =⇒ Ct > rXt ,
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P-almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. In other words, we assume that shareholders do not accept dividend
rates at or below the amount they could earn at the risk-free rate.
Remark 2.1. At any time t ≥ 0, we allow the excess dividend rate to increase beyond its historical
peak. If that were the case, we would have ct > zt .
Let (It)t≥0 denote the intrinsic value of the company’s total assets. Specifically, It is the total
assets of the company at t assuming that it it has the total assets of $1 at t = 0, all in equity with
no debt, and assuming it does not pay dividends during [0, t]. We assume that the intrinsic value
follows a geometric Brownian motion; specifically,
dIt
It
= (µ+ r)dt + σdWt ,
for some constants µ > 0 and σ > 0. Here, (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion on a filtered
probability space, (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P), in which (Ft)t≥0 is the filtration generated by the Brownian
motion and satisfies the usual conditions.
Given an investment policy (pit)t≥0 and an excess dividend policy (ct = Ct – rXt)t≥0, the net
surplus process (Xt)t≥0 is given by
dXt = pit
dIt
It
+
(
r(Xt – pit) – Ct
)
dt =
(
µpit – ct
)
dt + σpit dWt , (2.3)
with X0 = x ≥ 0. A pair of investment and dividend policies (pit , ct)t≥0 is admissible if it satisfies
the following conditions,
(i) (pit)t≥0 is (Ft)-progressively measurable, pit ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, and
∫∞
0 pi
2
t dt < ∞, P-almost
surely,
(ii) (ct)t≥0 is (Ft)-adapted, non-negative, and right-continuous with left limits; and,
(iii) (ct)t≥0 satisfies the drawdown constraint (2.1).
Let C(α, z) denote the set of all admissible investment and dividend policies.
For future reference, we also introduce one additional set of policies. The set of uncon-
strained policies C0 is the set of all investment and dividend policies (pit , ct) that satisfy Con-
ditions (i) and (ii) above, that is, we do not enforce the drawdown constraint (iii). Note that
C0 = limα→0+C(α, z).
We assume the company wishes to maximize the expectation of the discounted utility of the
dividends it pays, in excess of the risk-free interest, between now and when the net surplus reaches
bankruptcy. In particular, let τ denote the time of bankruptcy, that is,
τ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ 0
}
. (2.4)
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The time of ruin τ in (2.4) depends on the pair of admissible investment and dividend policies used
to control X in (2.3), but for simplicity of notation, we write τ instead of τX
(pit ,ct) . We consider
the following objective for the company,
sup
(pit ,ct)∈C(α,z)
E
[∫ τ
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt
]
. (2.5)
The constant δ > 0 denotes the subjective time preference parameter that represents the desirability
of paying dividends sooner rather than later. The constant p represents the shareholders’ constant
relative risk aversion, and we assume that
1
1 + κδ < p < 1, (2.6)
in which κ is defined by
κ = 2σ
2
µ2
. (2.7)
The feasibility constraint on p in (2.6), namely, p > 11+κδ , is common in the literature and dates
back to Merton (1969). Furthermore, if p > 1, then c
1–p
1–p is negative and increasing in c; thus, (2.5)
favors large values of c and small values of τ . It follows that immediate liquidation of the firm is
the optimal policy when p > 1.
Note also, that in the objective (2.5), we essentially assume that, when the net surplus reaches
0 at time τ , then the (excess) consumption rate ct = Ct = 0 with probability one for all t > τ . This
form of the objective function is consistent with
∫∞
0 e–δt
c1–pt
1–p dt =
∫ τ
0 e–δt
c1–pt
1–p dt for p in the range
given by (2.6). However, it implies that the drawdown constraint is violated after bankruptcy.
Remark 2.2. It is not possible to compare our optimal strategy with that of Dybvig (1995) or Arun
(2012) because there is no common ground between our model and theirs. Since we are working
with excess dividend rates, such common ground would be the case of zero interest rate, that is,
r = 0. However, Dybvig (1995) and Arun (2012) explicitly exclude the case of r = 0. The reason is
that both studies mandate that the wealth process X must always be positive (that is, τ =∞ with
probability 1) by making sure that there is always the possibility of funding the dividend payment
through the risk-free investment. To enforce this assumption, they imposed an upper bound on
feasible consumption processes of the form supt Ct = Zt ≤ rαXt , such that consumption can always
be funded by risk-free investment. This constraint is clearly unreasonable for r = 0 because it
would mean that the only feasible consumption is C ≡ 0.
By contrast with Dybvig (1995) and Arun (2012), we do not impose such upper bound on the
consumption process. Instead, we stop the problem when X hits 0. Indeed, since we work with
excess dividend processes, our result does not depend on r at all and would remain valid and
unchanged for r = 0.
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3 Optimal dividend policy under the drawdown constraint
The value function corresponding to the stochastic control problem (2.5) is
V(x, z) = sup
(pit ,ct)∈C(α,z)
Ex
[∫ τ
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt
]
, (3.1)
for (x, z) ∈ R2+, in which Ex denotes expectation conditional on X0 = x.
Our main goal in this section is to identify V(x, z) and the corresponding optimal investment
and dividend policies. The solution relies upon the relationship between the surplus at time t,
namely, Xt , and the historical peak of the dividend process, namely, zt = max
{
z, sup0≤s<t cs
}
.
Each time the surplus level reaches a new maximum, the company faces a decision whether or
not to increase the excess dividend rate beyond its historical peak. Increasing the excess dividend
rate might add value by increasing the expected value of utility of the excess dividend stream. But,
doing so raises the bar for the compulsory minimum excess dividend rate and decreases the time
to bankruptcy.
We hypothesize that there exists a critical surplus-to-historical peak ratio w∗ such that if Xt >
w∗zt , then the company will immediately raise its excess dividend rate to ct = Xt/w∗. Otherwise,
if Xt ≤ w∗zt , then the company will only increase its excess dividend rate to maintain Xs ≤ w∗zs
for all s ≥ t. Additionally, if 0 < Xt < w∗zt , then the company will pay dividends at a rate lying
in the interval [αzt , zt ].
As we will verify in the proof of Theorem 3.4 below, if we find a classical solution v(x, z) of the
following free-boundary problem (FBP) on D = {(x, z) ∈ R2+ : x ≤ zw∗, z > 0}, that is increasing
and concave in x, then v equals the value function V:
δv = max
pi∈R
[
µpivx +
1
2 σ
2pi2vxx
]
+ max
αz≤c≤z
[
c1–p
1 – p – cvx
]
,
v(0, z) = 0,
vz(w∗z, z) = 0 = vxz(w∗z, z).
(3.2)
The additional requirement that vxz(w∗z, z) = 0 is a so-called super-contact condition. This con-
dition ensures the optimality of the boundary w∗. Indeed, from Dixit (1991) and Dumas (1991),
we have the smooth-pasting condition vz(wˆz, z) = 0 for the value function that corresponds to
the barrier strategy defined by any value of wˆ > 0 in place of w∗, but for a barrier strategy to
be optimal, we must impose the higher-order condition vxz(w∗z, z) = 0. From this higher-order
condition, we deduce that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in (3.2) equals 0 along
the ray (x, z) = (w∗z, z) for z > 0. See Dixit (1991) and Dumas (1991) for further discussion of
value-matching, smooth-pasting (such as vz(w∗z, z) = 0), and super-contact conditions.
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(a): c∗ = α z
x = wα z
(b): α
z < c
∗ < z
x = w1 z
(c): c∗ = z
x = w∗ z
(d): c∗ =
x
w∗ (e)
Five regions in the zx-plane for the optimal dividend policy
µ = 0.0800, σ = 0.2000, κ = 12.5000, α = 0.5000,
δ = 0.2000, p = 0.8000, wα = 3.7030, w1 = 5.5947, w
∗ = 11.2992
Figure 1: A representative plot for the regions (a)-(e) in the z – x plane showing different behavior of the optimal
dividend policy. The optimally controlled process (z∗t , X∗t ) can only be in region (d) at t = 0, in which case it will
be immediately moved to line (e). Thereafter, the optimally controlled process stays in regions (a), (b), (c), and (e).
Region (e) acts as a reflective barrier, in the sense that the optimal controlled processes are stopped from passing
through by singular control at (e).
Furthermore, we hypothesize that there exist two other important surplus-to-historical peak
ratios, namely wα and w1 such that 0 < wα < w1 < w∗. Based on these critical values, we
hypothesize that the optimal dividend policy has the following structure:1
(a) If Xt < wαzt , then ct = αzt . In other words, if the surplus level is “very low,” it is optimal
for the firm to pay dividends at the lowest rate permitted by the drawdown constraint (2.1).
(b) If wαzt < Xt < w1zt , then ct = c∗(Xt , zt) ∈ (αzt , zt), for some function c∗(x, z). In this case,
the surplus is at an “intermediate level,” and the company distributes dividends at a rate
greater than that of the minimum possible rate, but lower than the historical peak.
(c) If w1z ≤ Xt < w∗z, then ct = zt . In this case, surplus is large enough so that it is optimal
to pay dividends at the historical peak but not large enough to raise the excess dividend rate
above this value.
(d) If Xt > w∗zt , then ct = Xtw∗ > zt . In other words, if the surplus level is “very large,” the
company will pay dividends at a rate greater than the historical peak. Note that, in this case,
the historical peak has a jump at t, that is, lims→t+ zs =
Xt
w∗ > zt .
1For simplicity of notation, we omit the superscript ∗ that indicates the processes are the optimally controlled
ones. So, throughout this ansatz, Xt = X∗t , zt = z∗t , and ct = c∗t . At times, we also omit the word “excess” when we
refer to the dividend rate; however, for the remainder of the paper, “dividend rate” means ct , the “excess dividend
rate.”
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(e) Along the line x = w∗z, the company increases its dividend rate via singular control to keep
Xt ≤ w∗zt .
By following the dividend policy above, the historical peak (zt) can have a jump only at time
t = 0 and only if rule (d) is applicable, that is, X0 > w∗z0. After this possible initial jump, the
process (Xt , zt)t≥0 will be kept in the domain
D = {(x, z) : 0 ≤ x ≤ w∗z, z > 0},
by applying the above rules. In particular, after a possible initial jump, (zt) is only allowed to
increase via singular control in order to keep (Xt , zt) inside D.
Remark 3.1. Define the running maximum of the surplus process by
M0 = w∗z0,
Mt = max
{
M0, max0≤s<tXs
}
; t > 0.
(3.3)
By the discussion above, we have Mt = w∗zt , for all t ≥ 0. In other words, the running maximum
of surplus, as defined in (3.3), is proportional to the historical peak of the excess dividend rate.
We have two main tasks ahead of us. First, we need to specify the unknowns wα, w1, w∗, and
c∗(x, z), along with the optimal investment policy pi∗(x, z). Second, we need to prove that the
dividend policy hypothesized above is optimal.
3.1 Reducing the dimension and applying the Legendre transform
The value function V in (3.1) is homogeneous of degree 1 – p with respect to x and z, that is,
V(βx,βz) = β1–pV(x, z),
for all β > 0. Thus, if we define the function U by
U(w) = V(w, 1),
for w ≥ 0, then we can recover V from U by
V(x, z) = z1–pU(x/z), (3.4)
for all (x, z) ∈ R2+.
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From (3.2) and (3.4), we deduce the following FBP for U for w ∈ [0,w∗], in which we identify
V with v, the solution of (3.2):
δU = max
pˆi∈R
[
µpˆiUw +
1
2 σ
2pˆi2Uww
]
+ max
α≤cˆ≤1
[
cˆ1–p
1 – p – cˆUw
]
,
U(0) = 0,
(1 – p)U(w∗) – w∗Uw(w∗) = 0,
pUw(w∗) + w∗Uww(w∗) = 0.
(3.5)
After we obtain pˆi∗ and cˆ∗, then we will be able to get pi∗ and c∗ for V’s problem via pi∗(x, z) =
pˆi∗(x/z)z and c∗(x, z) = cˆ∗(x/z)z.
Because V is increasing and concave with respect to x, U is increasing and concave with respect
to w; thus, we rewrite the HJB equation in (3.5) as follows:
1
κ
U2w
Uww
+ δU =

α1–p
1 – p – αUw , 0 ≤ w ≤ wα,
p
1 – p
(
Uw(w)
)– 1–pp , wα < w < w1,
1
1 – p – Uw , w1 ≤ w ≤ w
∗,
(3.6)
in which κ is defined in (2.7). Because of the non-linear terms U2w/Uww and
(
Uw(w)
)– 1–pp in (3.6), it
is natural to apply the Legendre transform to linearize this differential equation. Specifically, define
the dual variable y and the corresponding convex dual function Û by y = Uw and Û(y) = U(w)–wy,
respectively. Also, define y0 = Uw(0) and y∗ = Uw(w∗). Then, the differential equation in (3.6)
becomes the following linear differential equation:
y2Ûyy + κδyÛy – κδÛ =

κ
(
αy – α
1–p
1 – p
)
, α–p ≤ y ≤ y0,
– κp1 – p y
– 1–pp , 1 < y < α–p,
κ
(
y – 11 – p
)
, y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1.
(3.7)
In exchange for linearity, the boundary condition U(0) = 0 becomes the free-boundary condition
Û(y0) = 0 = Ûy(y0) for the unknown boundary y0 > α–p. Furthermore, the smooth-pasting and
super-contact conditions in (3.5) become, respectively,
(1 – p)Û(y∗) + py∗Ûy(y∗) = 0, (3.8)
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and
Ûy(y∗) + py∗Ûyy(y∗) = 0, (3.9)
at the unknown free-boundary 0 < y∗ < 1.
In the following proposition, we give the solution of this free-boundary problem.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose 11+κδ < p < 1. The solution Û of the differential equation (3.7) subject
to the free-boundary conditions Û(y0) = 0 = Ûy(y0) and equations (3.8) and (3.9) is given by
Û(y) =

C1y +C2y–κδ +
κα
1 + κδ y ln y +
α1–p
δ(1 – p) , α
–p ≤ y ≤ y0,
C3y +C4y–κδ +
κ
1 – p
p3
p(1 + κδ) – 1 y
– 1–pp , 1 < y < α–p,
C5y +C6y–κδ +
κ
1 + κδ y ln y +
1
δ(1 – p) , y
∗ ≤ y ≤ 1,
(3.10)
in which
C1 = –
κα
1 + κδ
(
ln η∗ – p lnα+ 1
η∗(1 – p) +
1
1 + κδ
)
, (3.11)
C2 =
α1–p(1+κδ)
1 + κδ
(
κ
1 + κδ (η
∗)1+κδ – 1
δ(1 – p) (η
∗)κδ
)
> 0, (3.12)
C3 = –
κα
1 + κδ
(
ln η∗ + 1
η∗(1 – p) – (1 + p)
)
, (3.13)
C4 =
α1–p(1+κδ)
1 + κδ
(
κ
1 + κδ (η
∗)1+κδ – 1
δ(1 – p) (η
∗)κδ – 1
δ(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)) < 0, (3.14)
C5 = –
κ
1 + κδ
(
α ln η∗ + α
η∗(1 – p) + (1 – α)(1 + p) +
1
1 + κδ
)
, (3.15)
C6 =
α1–p(1+κδ)
1 + κδ
(
κ
1 + κδ (η
∗)1+κδ – 1
δ(1 – p) (η
∗)κδ
)
– α
1–p(1+κδ) – 1
δ(1 + κδ)2
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) > 0, (3.16)
and η∗ = y0αp > 1 and 0 < y∗ < 1 uniquely solve the following system of two equations:
ln η
α
y +
α
η(1 – p) –
1
y = α(1 + p) – 1,
α1–p(1+κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) ( κ
1 + κδ η
1+κδ – 1
δ(1 – p) η
κδ
)
+
(
κ
1 + κδ y
1+κδ – 1
δ
yκδ
)
= α
1–p(1+κδ) – 1
δ(1 + κδ) .
(3.17)
Moreover, Û is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with continuous second derivative on (y∗, y0).
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Figure 2: A representative graph of the two curves defined by the equations in (3.17). The black solid curve (resp.,
the blue dotted curve) is implicitly defined by the first (resp., second) equation. The right plot is an enlargement of
the left plot over the horizontal axis, which better shows the solution of the system of equations. The chosen values
of the parameters are µ = 0.08, σ = 0.2, δ = 0.2, α = 0.5, and p = 0.8.
Proof. The expression for Û in (3.10) and the values of Ci for i = 1, 2, . . . , 6 in (3.11)-(3.16) follow
readily by solving (3.7), by imposing the free-boundary condition at y = y0, and by requiring that
Û have continuous derivative at the boundary points. Furthermore, we get the two equations in
(3.17) by imposing the free-boundary condition at y = y∗, by solving for C5 and C6 in terms of
y∗, and by then equating those expressions with the ones in (3.15) and (3.16), respectively. For the
reader’s convenience, we write C5 and C6 in terms of y∗.
C5 = –
κ
1 + κδ
(
ln y∗ + 1y∗ + p +
1
1 + κδ
)
, (3.18)
and
C6 =
1
δ(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) ((y∗)κδ – κδ1 + κδ (y∗)1+κδ
)
. (3.19)
Checking that Û is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with continuous second derivative on
(y∗, y0) is straightforward.
It remains to show that the two equations in (3.17) have a unique solution η∗ > 1 and 0 < y∗ < 1.
To that end, consider the second equation in (3.17). When y = 0, we can rewrite this equation as(
κ
1 + κδ η
1+κδ – 1
δ(1 – p) η
κδ
)
– 1 – α
p(1+κδ)–1
δ(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) = 0. (3.20)
When η = 1, the left side of (3.20) is negative. Furthermore, as η increases from 1 to 11–p , the left
side decreases; then, as η increases from 11–p to ∞, the left side increases from a negative number
to positive ∞. Thus, when y = 0, there exists a unique solution η > 1 of (3.20); moreover, this
unique solution is greater than 11–p .
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Next, differentiate the second equation in (3.17) with respect to y, treating η as a function of
y, to obtain
α1–p(1+κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)
ηκδ
(
1 – 1
η(1 – p)
) dη
dy = y
κδ
(1
y – 1
)
.
Thus, dηdy < 0 for 1 < η <
1
1–p , and
dη
dy > 0 for η >
1
1–p . We showed in the previous paragraph
that, when y = 0, the unique solution of (3.20) is greater than 11–p ; thus, as y increases, the unique
solution η of the second equation in (3.17) increases. It follows that we can restrict our attention
to the range η > 11–p , on which the curve defined by the second equation in (3.17) increases with
respect to y in the yη-plane, and as y increases from 0 to 1, η increases from some finite number
greater than 11–p to another finite number.
Finally, differentiate the first equation in (3.17) with respect to y to obtain
α
η
(
1 – 1
η(1 – p)
) dη
dy =
1
y
(
1 – 1y
)
.
Thus, for the first equation, dηdy < 0 when η >
1
1–p . Moreover, as y increases from 0 to some number
yp < 1, η decreases from ∞ to 11–p . In other words, this curve fully covers the range of η from 11–p
to ∞.
It follows from the above observations that there exists a unique point (y∗, η∗) ∈ (0, 1)× (1,∞)
of intersection of the two curves in (3.17); moreover, y∗ < yp and η∗ > 11–p .
In the following corollary, we show that Û decreases with respect to α, and we compute Û as
α → 0+; we will use this result in the proof of Theorem 3.4 to show that the candidate value
function satisfies the so-called transversality condition, see Lemma A.3.
Corollary 3.3. Û(y) is non-decreasing with respect to α, for any fixed value of y ∈ (y∗, y0).
Proof. Clearly Û is differentiable with respect to α. To find the differential equation that Ûα solves,
differentiate (3.7) with respect to α to obtain
y2(Ûα)yy + κδy(Ûα)y – κδÛα =

κ
(
y – α–p
)
, α–p ≤ y ≤ y0,
0, y∗ ≤ y < α–p.
Thus, if we define G by
G(y,φ,φy ,φyy) = κδφ – κδyφy – y2φyy ,
then G is increasing in φ and decreasing in φyy . In other words, it satisfies the monotonicity
requirement (0.1) in Crandall et al. (1992). Also, note that G(y, Ûα, (Ûα)y , (Ûα)yy) ≤ 0; thus, if
we show Ûα(y∗) ≤ 0 and Ûα(y0) ≤ 0, then, from Theorem 3.3 of Crandall et al. (1992), we can
deduce that Ûα ≤ 0 for α ∈ (0, 1) and all y∗ ≤ y ≤ y0.
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Ûy(y)
y∗ = 0.4477, y0 = 12.1901
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Figure 3: A representative graph of Û(y) and its first two derivatives. The parameters are as in Figure 2. The vertical
dotted lines are y = y∗ = 0.04477 and y = y0 = 12.1901, respectively.
To show Ûα(y∗) ≤ 0, use the free-boundary conditions in (3.8) and (3.9), along with the
differential equation for Û in (3.7), to compute
Û(y∗) = κp
2
p(1 + κδ) – 1
( 1
1 – p – y
∗
)
.
Differentiate this expression with respect to α and cancel factors of ∂y
∗
∂α to obtain
Ûα(y∗) = –
κp2
p(1 + κδ) – 1 < 0.
Similarly, the free-boundary condition at y0, namely, Û(y0) = 0 implies that Ûα(y0) = 0. Thus, it
follows that Û(y) is non-increasing with respect to α for any fixed value of y∗ < y < y0.
Figure 3 illustrates Û given by (3.10) for specific values of the parameters. Note that Û is a
decreasing and convex function, as expected. In the next section, we describe the solution of the
HJB equation (3.5) in terms of Û.
3.2 Reversing the Legendre transform to obtain V and the optimal policy
Because we obtained Û’s FBP by applying the convex Legendre transform to U’s FBP, we now
reverse this process and obtain U as the concave Legendre transform of Û. Specifically, U(w) =
Û(y) – yÛy(y), in which y ∈ [y∗, y0] uniquely solves w = –Ûy(y). We are able to solve w = –Ûy(y)
because Û is strictly decreasing and convex, and it follows that U is increasing and concave, as
expected. The following theorem summarizes these (relatively straightforward) computations; in
its statement, we rely on the notation of Proposition 3.2.
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Theorem 3.4. Suppose 11+κδ < p < 1. Let η
∗ and y∗ be the solution of (3.17) and define y0 :=
η∗α–p. Furthermore, define wα, w1, and w∗ by
wα =
κα
1 + κδ
{
ln η∗ +
(
κδ
1 + κδ –
1
η∗(1 – p)
)(
(η∗)1+κδ – 1
)}
,
w1 =
κ
1 + κδ
{
ln y∗ + p +
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 + (y
∗)1+κδ
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)}
,
and
w∗ = κpp(1 + κδ) – 1
{ 1
y∗ – (1 – p)
}
. (3.21)
If (x, z) ∈ D, that is, 0 ≤ x ≤ w∗z, the value function V in (3.1) is given by
V(x, z) =

καz1–py
1 + κδ
{(y0
y
)1+κδ
– 1
}
– (αz)
1–p
δ(1 – p)
{(y0
y
)κδ
– 1
}
, 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz,{
κδp2
1 – p y
– 1–pp –
(
κδ(y∗)1+κδ
1 + κδ – (y
∗)κδ + 11 + κδ
)
y–κδ
}
× z
1–p
δ
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) , wαz < x < w1z,
z1–p
p(1 + κδ) – 1
(1
δ
– κy
∗
1 + κδ
)(y∗
y
)κδ
+ z
1–p
δ(1 – p) –
κz1–py
1 + κδ , w1z ≤ x ≤ w
∗z.
(3.22)
Here, y ∈ [y∗, y0] uniquely solves –Ûy(y) = x/z.
Moreover, when the optimally controlled surplus and peak excess dividend rate lie in D, that is,
0 ≤ X∗t ≤ w∗z∗t , then the optimal policies are given in feedback form by (pi∗(X∗t , z∗t ), c∗(X∗t , z∗t )
)
, in
which
pi∗(x, z) = – µ
σ2
zUw(x/z)
Uww(x/z)
= µ
σ2
zyÛyy(y), (3.23)
and
c∗(x, z) =

αz, 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz,
y–
1
p z, wαz < x < w1z,
z, w1z ≤ x < w∗z.
(3.24)
Along the line x = w∗z, the company increases the excess dividend rate via singular control to keep
(X∗t , z∗t ) within D, that is, X∗t ≤ w∗z∗t .
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Figure 4: A representative graph of V(x, 1) and its first two derivatives with respect to x. The vertical dotted lines
correspond to x = wα = 3.703, x = w1 = 5.5947, and x = w∗ = 11.2992, respectively. The parameters are as in
Figure 2.
If x > w∗z, then the company sets its initial investment policy to
pi∗(x, z) = – µ
σ2
Uw(w∗)
w∗Uww(w∗)
x = µ
σ2
y∗
w∗ Ûyy(y
∗) x, (3.25)
and immediately increases its excess dividend rate to
c∗(x, z) = xw∗ , (3.26)
with corresponding value function
V(x, z) = x
1–p
1 – p
κp(w∗)p(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)
w∗ + κp(1 – p)
. (3.27)
Thereafter, the company increases the excess dividend rate only as needed to keep X∗t ≤ w∗z∗t .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 4 illustrates V(x, 1) = U(x) given by Theorem 3.4, along with its derivatives with respect
to x. Note that U is the concave Legendre transform of Û illustrated by Figure 3.
Remark 3.5. For the reader’s reference, we now give the explicit equation solved by y, namely,
–Ûy(y) = x/z:
x
z =

κα
1 + κδ
{
ln y0y +
(
κδ
1 + κδ –
α–p
y0(1 – p)
)((y0
y
)1+κδ
– 1
)}
, 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz,
κ
1 + κδ
(
ln y∗ + 1y∗ – 1
)
+ κp
2
p(1 + κδ) – 1 y
– 1p
– κy
–(1+κδ)
(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) {κδ(y∗)1+κδ
1 + κδ – (y
∗)κδ + 11 + κδ
}
, wαz < x < w1z,
κ
1 + κδ
{
ln y
∗
y + p +
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 + (y
∗/y)1+κδ
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)}
, w1z ≤ x ≤ w∗z.
(3.28)
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The intervals 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz, wαz < x < w1z, and w1z ≤ x ≤ w∗z correspond to α–p ≤ y ≤ y0,
1 < y < α–p, and y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1, respectively. Also, pi∗(x, z) is given by
pi∗(x, z) =

2αz
µ
{(
κδ
1 + κδ –
α–p
y0(1 – p)
)(y0
y
)1+κδ
+ 11 + κδ
}
, 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz,
2z
µ
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) {py– 1p – y–(1+κδ)1 + κδ +
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(y∗
y
)1+κδ}
, wαz < x < w1z,
2z
µ
{
1
1 + κδ +
1
p(1 + κδ) – 1
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(y∗
y
)1+κδ}
, w1z ≤ x ≤ w∗z,
4 Properties of the optimal policy and the value function
In the final section of the paper, we investigate further properties of the optimal policy and the
value function.
In the next corollary, we examine how pi∗ and c∗ change with respect to the state variables x
and z. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate these properties.
Corollary 4.1. The optimal feedback functions pi∗ = pi∗(x, z) and c∗ = c∗(x, z) from (3.23) and
(3.24), respectively, satisfy the following properties.
(a) For wαz < x < w1z and z > 0, c∗ is increasing and convex with respect to x.
(b) For 0 < x < wαz and w1z < x < w∗z and for z > 0, pi∗ is increasing and convex with respect
to x.
(c) For wαz < x < w1z and z > 0, pi∗ is increasing and concave with respect to x.
Proof. For wαz < x < w1z, c∗ is proportional to y–
1
p . Recall that y = Uw ; thus,
∂c∗
∂x ∝ –
1
p y
– 1p–1 ∂y
∂x ∝ –y
– 1p–1Uww ∝ y
– 1p–1
Ûyy
> 0.
We have shown that c∗ increases with x. Moreover,
∂2c∗
∂x2 ∝
∂
∂x
y–
1
p–1
Ûyy
∝
{
– 1 + pp y
– 1p–2 Ûyy – y–
1
p–1 Ûyyy
}
∂y
∂x
∝ 1 + pp Ûyy + yÛyyy ∝
(
(1 + p) – p(2 + κδ)
)
C4 ∝ p(1 + κδ) – 1 > 0,
because C4 < 0. We have shown that c∗ is convex in x.
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Figure 5: Graph of pi∗(x, 1) on the left, and graphs of pi∗(x, 1) and pi∗(x, 2) on the right. In both graphs, the dashed
diagonal line is pi∗(x, z) = – µ
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Uw(w∗)
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x, which equals the optimal investment policy when x > w∗z. The
vertical dotted lines correspond to x = wα = 3.703, x = w1 = 5.5947, and x = w∗ = 11.2992, respectively. The
parameters are as in Figure 2. Note that changing z would simply scale the graph. Furthermore, the graphs clearly
show that pi∗(x, z) satisfies Conditions (b) and (c) of Corollary 4.1.
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Figure 6: Graph of c∗(x, 1) on the left, and graphs of c∗(x, 1) and c∗(x, 2) on the right. In both graphs, the dashed
diagonal line is c∗(x, z) = xw∗ , which equals the optimal dividend policy when x > w
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correspond to x = wα = 3.703, x = w1 = 5.5947, and x = w∗ = 11.2992, respectively. The parameters are as in Figure
2. Note that changing z would simply scale the graphs. Furthermore, the graphs clearly show that c∗(x, z) satisfies
Condition (a) of Corollary 4.1. Finally, despite appearances, c∗(x, z) is not linear in x over the range x ∈ (wαz,w1z).
The reason that it appears almost linear is that, in equation (3.28), the term involving
(
y(x/z)
)–1/p dominates the
term involving y–(1+κδ).
For 0 < x < w∗z, pi∗ is proportional to yÛyy ; thus, except at x = wαz and x = w1z,
∂pi∗
∂x ∝
(
Ûyy + yÛyyy
) ∂y
∂x ∝ –
Ûyy + yÛyyy
Ûyy
.
For 0 < x < wαz, from the expression for Û in (3.10), we obtain
–
(
Ûyy + yÛyyy
)
∝ C2 > 0.
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For wαz < x < w1z, or equivalently, 1 < y < α–p,
–
(
Ûyy + yÛyyy
)
∝ κδ(1 + κδ)2C4y–(1+κδ) + κp(1 + κδ) – 1 y
– 1p
∝ (1 + κδ)
{
– 11 + κδ + (y
∗)κδ – κδ1 + κδ (y
∗)1+κδ
}
y–(1+κδ) + y–
1
p
=
(
y–
1
p – y–(1+κδ)
)
+
(1 + κδ
y∗ – κδ
)(y∗
y
)1+κδ
> 0,
in which the second line follows from the expression for C4 in (A.5). In the last line, the expression
in the first set of parentheses is positive because y > 1 and p(1 + κδ) > 1, and the expression in
the second set of parentheses is positive because 0 < y∗ < 1. Finally, for w1z < x < w∗z,
–
(
Ûyy + yÛyyy
)
∝ C6 > 0,
We have shown that pi∗ increases with x.
For 0 < x < w∗z, except at x = wαz and x = w1z,
∂2pi∗
∂x2 ∝ –
∂
∂x
yÛyyy
Ûyy
∝ –
{
Ûyy
(
Ûyyy + yÛyyyy
)
– yÛ2yyy
}
∂y
∂x ∝ Ûyy
(
Ûyyy + yÛyyyy
)
– yÛ2yyy .
For 0 < x < wαz, from the expression for Û in (3.10), we obtain
Ûyy
(
Ûyyy + yÛyyyy
)
– yÛ2yyy ∝ C2 > 0,
because C2 > 0. We obtain a similar expression for w1z < x < w∗z, except with α and C2 replaced
by 1 and C6 > 0, respectively. Thus, pi∗ is convex in x for 0 < x < wαz and w1z < x < w∗z. For
wαz < x < w1z,
Ûyy
(
Ûyyy + yÛyyyy
)
– yÛ2yyy ∝ C4 < 0;
thus, pi∗ is concave in x for wαz < x < w1z.
Remark 4.2. It is interesting that pi∗ is convex in x when the constraints αz ≤ c ≤ z bind in D.
It’s as if the company invests more aggressively with increasing surplus so that surplus will further
increase and the company can either avoid the lower constraint αz or increase its dividend rate
beyond the upper constraint z via singular control along the free-boundary x = w∗z.
Next, we examine the effect of changing the drawdown parameter α on the value function and
the optimal policy. Figure 7 illustrates the sensitivity of the free boundaries wα, w1, and w∗ to α.
The graph indicates that all three are are increasing with respect to α. In the next corollary, we
prove the result for w∗.
Corollary 4.3. The free boundary w∗ given in (3.21) increases with respect to α.
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Proof. By differentiating the expression in (3.21) with respect to α, we obtain
∂w∗
∂α
= – κpp(1 + κδ) – 1
1
(y∗)2
∂y∗
∂α
∝ – ∂y
∗
∂α
.
Thus, if we show that y∗ decreases with respect to α, then we are done. To that end, differentiate
the first equation in (3.17) with respect to α to obtain(
α
η∗ –
α
(η∗)2(1 – p)
)
∂η∗
∂α
=
( 1
y∗ –
1
(y∗)2
)
∂y∗
∂α
– 1
α
(
ln y∗ + 1y∗
)
. (4.1)
Next, differentiate the second equation in (3.17) with respect to α and rearrange the resulting
equation to obtain
(η∗)1+κδ
(
α
η∗ –
α
(η∗)2(1 – p)
)
∂η∗
∂α
+ α
p(1+κδ)–1
κδ
(
κδ
1 + κδ (y
∗)1+κδ – (y∗)κδ
)
+ α
p(1+κδ)–1
p(1 + κδ) – 1(y
∗)1+κδ
( 1
y∗ –
1
(y∗)2
)
∂y∗
∂α
= – α
p(1+κδ)–1
κδ(1 + κδ) .
Into the above expression, substitute for the left side of (4.1) and rearrange to get
∂y∗
∂α
∝ α
p(1+κδ)–1
κδ
( 1
1 + κδ +
κδ
1 + κδ (y
∗)1+κδ – (y∗)κδ
)
– (η
∗)1+κδ
α
(
ln y∗ + 1y∗
)
.
Use the equations in (3.17) to write this expression in terms of η∗; specifically,
∂y∗
∂α
∝ 1
κδ(1 + κδ) –
p(1 + κδ) – 1
κδ
(
κδ
1 + κδ (η
∗)1+κδ – 11 – p (η
∗)κδ
)
– (η
∗)1+κδ
α
{
α
(
ln η∗ + 1
η∗(1 – p)
)
– α(1 + p) + 1
}
∝ (η
∗)–(1+κδ)
κδ(1 + κδ) +
( 1
1 + κδ + 1 –
1
α
)
– 1 + κδ
κδη∗ – ln η
∗.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 α
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
w
=
x z
The free boundaries wα, w1, and w
∗ vs. α
w∗
w1
wα
µ = 0.0800, σ = 0.2000, κ = 12.5000, δ = 0.2000
Figure 7: Sensitivity of the free boundaries wα, w1, and w∗ with respect to α. As proved in Corollary 4.3, w∗ is
increasing in α. It appears that the other two boundaries are also increasing in α.
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Define f by
f (η) = η
–(1+κδ)
κδ(1 + κδ) +
( 1
1 + κδ + 1 –
1
α
)
– 1 + κδ
κδη
– ln η.
for η ≥ 1. Note that f (1) = –1/α < 0, and
f ′(η) ∝ 1 + κδ
η
– 1
η1+κδ
– κδ =: g(η).
Note that g(1) = 0 and
g ′(η) ∝ 1 – ηκδ < 0, for η > 1.
Thus, g(η) ≤ 0 for η ≥ 1, which implies that f ′(η) ≤ 0 for η ≥ 1, which further implies that
f (η) < 0 for η ≥ 1. Therefore, because f is proportional to ∂y∗∂α , we have shown that y∗ decreases
with α, and w∗ increases with α.
Remark 4.4. It is intuitively pleasing that w∗ increases with the drawdown parameter α because
as α increases, the lower bound on the excess dividend rate increases, and we expect the company
to be less willing to increase its historical peak.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 illustrate, respectively, how the value function V(x, 1), the optimal invest-
ment policy pi∗(x, 1), and the optimal dividend policy c∗(x, 1) change with respect to α ∈ (0, 1).
In the final two corollaries, we consider limiting cases of our problem, namely, α → 0+ and
α → 1–, respectively. Without working through all the details (that is, providing an explicit
verification theorem and proving that the proposed solution is the classical solution of the resulting
variational inequality), one can show that the limit of the expression in (3.22) is the solution of
the limiting problem. In other words, our solution is continuous with respect to the drawdown
parameter α.
In the first case, V in (3.1) becomes the value function for the following optimization problem:
V0(x) = sup
(pit ,ct)∈C0
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt
]
,
which is the infinite-horizon, optimal-consumption Merton problem; see Section VI in Merton
(1969). (Under the optimal policy, τ =∞; thus, we may replace τ with ∞ in the integral.) Recall
that C0 is the set of strategies with no drawdown constraint on the excess dividend rate, that is,
we only require ct ≥ 0. Thus, the set of admissible strategies C0 = C(0, z) is independent of the
value of z, and the optimal policy does not depend on {zt}, as we observe below in (4.2) and (4.3).
Corollary 4.5. If we let α→ 0+, then (3.22) becomes
V0(x) =
x1–p
1 – p
(
κp2
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)p
,
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Plot of V (x, 1) vs. x and 0 < α < 1
0 10 20 30
x
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
V (x, 1)
Plot of V (x, 1) for three values of α
α = 0.00
α = 0.50
α = 1.00
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Figure 8: On the left: the value function V(x, 1) for different values of α. As expected, increasing α decreases the
value function, since this reduces the set of admissible policies. On the right, three value functions are plotted,
namely, the value function of the Merton problem α = 0 (the solid curve), the value function for the ratcheting
problem α = 1 (the dotted curve), and the value function for a drawdown problem with α = 0.5 (the dashed curve).
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Plot of pi∗(x, 1) for three values of α
α = 0.00
α = 0.50
α = 1.00
µ = 0.0800, σ = 0.2000, κ = 12.5000, δ = 0.2000
Figure 9: On the left: the optimal investment policy pi∗(x, 1) for different values of α. On the right, the optimal
policy pi∗(x, 1) for the Merton problem (solid curve with α = 0), the ratcheting problem (dotted curve for α = 1),
and a drawdown problem with α = 0.5 (the dashed curve).
for x > 0, and the optimal investment and excess dividend feedback functions are given by
pi0(x) =
µ
σ2p x, (4.2)
and
c0(x) =
p(1 + κδ) – 1
κp2 x. (4.3)
The second limiting case, α→ 1–, means that we impose a ratcheting constraint on the excess
dividend rate, that is, the excess dividend rate is never allowed to decrease below its current level,
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as in Dybvig (1995). However, Dybvig (1995) frames his problem in such a way that the probability
of ruin was 0, that is, he required that the dividend (or consumption) rate Ct ≤ rXt . By contrast,
we require that Ct ≥ rXt .
Corollary 4.6. If we let α→ 1–, then (3.22) becomes
V(x, z) =

z1–p
p(1 + κδ) – 1
(1
δ
– κy
∗
1 + κδ
)(y∗
y
)κδ
+ z
1–p
δ(1 – p) –
κz1–py
1 + κδ , 0 ≤ x ≤ w
∗z,
x1–p
1 – p
κp
p(1 + κδ) – 1
(w∗)p
w∗ + κp(1 – p) , x > w
∗z,
and the optimal investment and excess dividend feedback functions are given by
pi1(x, z) =

2z
µ
{
1
1 + κδ +
1
p(1 + κδ) – 1
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(y∗
y
)1+κδ}
, 0 ≤ x ≤ w∗z,
2x
µ
1
κp
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) , x > w∗z,
and
c1(x, z) =

z, 0 ≤ x ≤ w∗z,
x
w∗ , x > w
∗z.
In the above expressions, given 0 ≤ x ≤ w∗z, y ∈ [y∗, y0] uniquely solves
x
z =
κ
1 + κδ
{
ln y
∗
y + p +
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 + (y
∗/y)1+κδ
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)}
.
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Figure 10: On the left: the optimal dividend policy c∗(x, 1) for different values of α. On the right, the optimal
dividend policy c∗(x, 1) for the Merton problem (solid curve with α = 0), the ratcheting problem (dotted curve for
α = 1), and the a drawdown problem with α = 0.5 (the dashed curve).
23
x0
5
10
15
20
25
30
p
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
V (x, 1)
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Plot of V (x, 1) vs. x and 0.286 ≈ 11+κ δ < p < 1
0 10 20 30
x
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
V (x, 1)
Plot of V (x, 1) for three values of p
p = 0.29
p = 0.62
p = 0.95
µ = 0.0800, σ = 0.2000, κ = 12.5000, δ = 0.2000
Figure 11: On left: the value function V(x, 1) for different values of p between 11+κ δ ≈ 0.286 and 1. Note that as
p → 1–, the utility function c1–p1–p →∞ for all c. Thus, the value function goes to infinity as p → 1–. Furthermore, as
in Merton (1969), the value function also explodes as p → 11+κ δ . On the right, the value function V(x, 1) is plotted
for three values of p, namely, p = 0.29 (the solid curve), p = 0.62 (the dotted curve), and p = 0.95 (the dashed curve).
Remark 4.7. In these two corollaries, we see that the drawdown parameter α provides a link
between Merton’s optimal consumption problem and the ratcheting problem. Arun (2012) observes
the same connection between Merton’s optimal consumption problem and the ratcheting problem of
Dybvig (1995). Recall that neither the results of Arun (2012) nor of Dybvig (1995) are comparable
to ours because they both require the dividend/consumption rate to be such that ruin is impossible,
while our model allows ruin to occur.
We end the paper by commenting on the effect of the risk aversion parameter on the value
function. As p → 11+κ δ , the value function become arbitrary large and the control problem is
ill-posed for 0 ≤ p ≤ 11+κ δ . As pointed out earlier, this phenomenon has been observed in other
studies such as Merton (1969). Furthermore, since the utility function c
1–p
1–p goes to infinity as
p → 1–, the value function explodes there, too. Figure 11 illustrates these properties.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.4
For the clarity of the arguments in this section, we use the notation V˜ to refer to the value function
given by (3.1), that is,
V˜(x, z) := sup
(pit ,ct)∈C(α,z)
Ex
[∫ τ
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt
]
; (x, z) ∈ R2+.
We reserve the notation V to refer to the solution of the free-boundary problem (3.2), given by
(3.22) on D and (3.27) on R2+ –D.
The proof is dividend into two parts. For all x, z ≥ 0, we show in Section A.1 that V(x, z) ≥
V˜(x, z). Then, in Section A.2, we show that V(x, z) ≤ V˜(x, z). We, thereby, prove that V is the
value function.
A.1 Showing that V(x , z) ≥ V˜(x , z)
We start by providing a (smooth) comparison lemma for (3.1).
Lemma A.1. Suppose that function v : R2+ → R is continuously twice differentiable in x and
continuously differentiable in z, such that, for all x, z ≥ 0, pi ∈ R, and c ≥ αz,
(i) vz(x, z) ≤ 0, and
(ii) 12 σ
2pi2vxx(x, z) + (µpi – c)vx(x, z) – δv(x, z) +
c1–p
1 – p ≤ 0.
Then, v(x, z) ≥ V˜(x, z), for all x, z ≥ 0.
Proof. First, note that by Condition (ii),
v(x, z) ≥ 0; ∀x, z ≥ 0. (A.1)
To see this, let pi = 0, so that Condition (ii) becomes
–cvx(x, z) – δv(x, z) +
c1–p
1 – p ≤ 0.
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Note that vx(x, z) ≥ 0, otherwise this equation is violated by choosing c > –δv(x, z)/vx(x, z). By
maximizing over all c ≥ 0, we then obtain
δv(x, z) ≥ sup
c≥0
{
c1–p
1 – p – c vx(x, z)
}
= p1 – p
(
vx(x, z)
)p–1
p ≥ 0,
which, in turn, yields v(x, z) ≥ 0.
Fix arbitrary initial values x, z ≥ 0, and choose a policy (pit , ct) ∈ C(α, z). Let the processes
(zt) and (Xt) be given by (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Define τn by
τn = n ∧ τ ∧ inf
{
t > 0 :
∫ t
0
e–δspi2s v2x (Xs, zs)ds ≥ n
}
.
Recall that τ depends on the policy (pit , ct). Applying Itô’s lemma to e–δt v(Xt , zt) on [0, τn ] yields
e–δτn v(Xτn , zτn ) = v(x, z) –
∫ τn
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt
+
∫ τn
0
e–δt
[
1
2σ
2pi2t vxx + (µpit – ct)vx – δv +
c1–pt
1 – p
]
dt +
∫ τn
0
σ e–δtpit vx dWt
+
∫ τn
0
e–δt vz dzct +
∑
0≤t≤τn
e–δt
(
v(Xt , zt+) – v(Xt , zt)
)
,
in which (zct ) is the continuous version of (zt) obtained by removing the jumps. Taking expectations
of both sides yields
Ex
∫ τn
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt = v(x, z) – E
x
(
e–δτn v(Xτn , zτn )
)
+ Ex
∫ τn
0
e–δt
[
1
2σ
2pi2t vxx + (µpit – ct)vx – δv +
c1–pt
1 – p
]
dt
+ Ex
(∫ τn
0
e–δt vz dzct +
∑
0≤t≤τn
e–δt
(
v(Xt , zt+) – v(Xt , zt)
))
.
By (A.1) and Conditions (i) and (ii), the terms on the right side involving expectations are non-
positive; therefore,
v(x, z) ≥ Ex
∫ τn
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt.
By letting n →∞, we obtain
v(x, z) ≥ Ex
∫ τ
0
e–δt c
1–p
t
1 – p dt.
The inequality v ≥ V˜ follows by taking the supremum over all (pit , ct) ∈ C(α, z).
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Next, we show that V(x, z) ≥ V˜(x, z) for all x, z ≥ 0 by checking that V satisfies the conditions
in Lemma A.1.
The differentiability conditions are readily verified from (3.22) and (3.27). Below, we check
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma A.1.
Condition (i): On R2+–D, from (3.27) it follows that Vz = 0. It only remains to show that Vz ≤ 0
on D. Because V(x, z) = z1–pU(x/z), inequality Vz ≤ 0 is equivalent to (1 – p)U – wUw ≤ 0. By
rewriting this inequality in terms of Û, we deduce that Vz ≤ 0 is equivalent to (1– p)Û+pyÛy ≤ 0.
By construction, we know that (1 – p)Û(y∗) + py∗Ûy(y∗) = 0 and (1 – p)Û(y0) + py0Ûy(y0) = 0.
Thus, if we show that (1 – p)Û + pyÛy decreases then increases as y increases from y∗ to y0, then
we will have shown that Vz ≤ 0 on D.
Begin by considering (1–p)Û+pyÛy on the interval y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1; then, (1–p)Û+pyÛy decreases
if and only if
d
dy
(
(1 – p)Û(y) + pyÛy(y)
)
= Ûy(y) + pyÛyy(y) ≤ 0,
which, on this interval, is equivalent to
C5 + κδ
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)
C6y–(1+κδ) +
κ
1 + κδ
(
1 + p + ln y
) ≤ 0. (A.2)
By substituting the expressions for C5 and C6 given in (3.18) and (3.19), respectively, and by
simplifying the result, inequality (A.2) becomes
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 –
(y∗
y
)1+κδ)
+ ln y
∗
y ≥ 0.
Define f by
f (x) =
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 – x1+κδ
)
+ ln x,
for y∗ ≤ x ≤ 1. First, show that f (y∗) > 0 for any y∗ ∈ (0, 1). To that end, define g by
g(x) =
(1
x –
κδ
1 + κδ
)(
1 – x1+κδ
)
+ ln x,
for 0 < x ≤ 1. It is easy to show that limx→0+ g(x) = +∞ because 1/x dominates ln x, g(1) = 0,
and g ′(x) < 0 for 0 < x < 1. Thus, g(x) > 0 for all 0 < x < 1, which implies that f (y∗) > 0. Next,
observe that f (1) = 0, and
f ′′(x) = –κδ(1 + κδ)
( 1
y∗ –
κδ
1 + κδ
)
xκδ–1 – 1x2 < 0.
Because f is concave, we deduce that f (x) ≥ 0 for all y∗ ≤ x ≤ 1. Thus, we have shown that
(1–p)Û+pyÛy decreases on the interval y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1, which implies that Vz ≤ 0 for w1z ≤ x ≤ w∗z.
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Next, consider (1 – p)Û+ pyÛy on the interval 1 < y < α–p; then, (1 – p)Û+ pyÛy decreases on
this interval if and only if
C3 + κδ
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)
C4y–(1+κδ) ≤ 0. (A.3)
Rewrite C3 and C4 from (3.13) and (3.14) in terms of y∗ by using the equations in (3.17), that is,
C3 = –
κ
1 + κδ
{ 1
y∗ + ln y
∗ – 1
}
, (A.4)
and
C4 =
1
δ(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) {– 11 + κδ + (y∗)κδ – κδ1 + κδ (y∗)1+κδ
}
. (A.5)
Substitute C3 and C4 from (A.4) and (A.5), respectively, into inequality (A.3) and simplify the
result to obtain{ 1
y∗ + ln y
∗ – 1
}
+
{ 1
1 + κδ – (y
∗)κδ + κδ1 + κδ (y
∗)1+κδ
}
y–(1+κδ) ≥ 0. (A.6)
We will demonstrate that inequality (A.6) holds by showing that the expressions in each of the
curly brackets is positive for any value of y∗ ∈ (0, 1). First, define h by
h(x) = 1x + ln x – 1,
for 0 < x ≤ 1. Note that h(0+) = +∞, h(1) = 0, and h ′(x) < 0 for 0 < x < 1; thus, h(x) > 0 for
0 < x < 1. Second, define j by
j(x) = 11 + κδ – x
κδ + κδ1 + κδ x
1+κδ,
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Note that j(0) = 11+κδ > 0, j(1) = 0, and j ′(x) < 0 for 0 < x < 1; thus, j(x) > 0
for 0 < x < 1. Thus, we have shown that (1 – p)Û + pyÛy decreases on the interval 1 < y < α–p,
which implies that Vz ≤ 0 for wαz < x < w1z.
Finally, consider (1 – p)Û + pyÛy on the interval α–p ≤ y ≤ y0. On this interval, we will show
that (1 – p)Û + pyÛy is convex (that is, this expression first decreases then increases as y increases
from α–p to y0), which is equivalent to showing that
d
dy
(
C1 + κδ
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)
C2y–(1+κδ) +
κα
1 + κδ
(
1 + p + ln y
))
> 0. (A.7)
After substituting the expression for C2 from (3.12), writing η∗ = y0αp, and simplifying the result,
inequality (A.7) becomes
1
1 + κδ –
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) { κδ
1 + κδ –
1
η∗(1 – p)
}(y0
y
)1+κδ
> 0.
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Define k by
k(x) = 11 + κδ –
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) { κδ
1 + κδ –
1
η∗(1 – p)
}
x1+κδ,
for 1 ≤ x ≤ η∗.
k ′(x) = –(1 + κδ)
(
p(1 + κδ) – 1
) { κδ
1 + κδ –
1
η∗(1 – p)
}
xκδ.
k ′(x) < 0 because p(1 + κδ) – 1 > 0 and the expression in the curly brackets is positive; the latter
follows from the second equation in (3.17). Thus, to show that k(x) > 0 for 1 ≤ x ≤ η∗, it is enough
to show that k(η∗) > 0. After using the second equation in (3.17) to rewrite k(η∗) > 0 in terms of
y∗, we obtain
αp(1+κδ)–1
( 1
1 + κδ – (y
∗)κδ + κδ1 + κδ (y
∗)1+κδ
)
> 0,
which we know is true from having shown that j(x) > 0 for all 0 < x < 1. Thus, we have shown that
(1– p)Û+pyÛy is convex on the interval α–p ≤ y ≤ y0, which implies that Vz ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ wαz.
Condition (ii): This condition is satisfied on D because, by construction, the expression for V
given in (3.22) satisfies the free-boundary problem in (3.2). To check the condition on R2+ –D, we
need to show that
Lpi,c V(x, z) := 12 σ
2pi2Vxx(x, z) + (µpi – c)Vx(x, z) +
c1–p
1 – p – δV(x, z) ≤ 0,
for all pi ∈ R and c ≥ αx/w∗, and for all x > w∗z. Note that on R2+ – D, we have obtained the
expression for V given in (3.27) from V(x, z) = V(x, x/w∗), in which V(x, x/w∗) is given by (3.22).
From the free-boundary conditions Vz(x, x/w∗) = 0 and Vxz(x, x/w∗) = 0, we deduce that, for
x > w∗z,
∂
∂xV(x, z) =
∂
∂xV(x, x/w
∗) = Vx(x, x/w∗) +
1
w∗Vz(x, x/w
∗) = Vx(x, x/w∗),
and
∂2
∂x2V(x, z) =
∂
∂xVx(x, x/w
∗) = Vxx(x, x/w∗) +
1
w∗Vxz(x, x/w
∗) = Vxx(x, x/w∗).
Thus, for x > w∗z, Lpi,c V(x, z) = Lpi,c V(x, x/w∗) ≤ 0 because (x, x/w∗) ∈ D, and Lpi,c V ≤ 0 on
D.
A.2 Showing that V(x , z) ≤ V˜(x , z)
Let the functions pi∗(x, z) and c∗(x, z) be given by (3.23)–(3.26) on R2+. To show that V(x, z) ≤
V˜(x, z) for all x, z ≥ 0, it suffices to show that the following two conditions hold. For all x, z ≥ 0,
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(iii) the following stochastic differential equation (SDE) has a unique strong solution (X∗t )t≥0,
dX∗t =
(
µpi∗
(
X∗t ,
M∗t
w∗
)
– c∗
(
X∗t ,
M∗t
w∗
) )
dt + σpi∗
(
X∗t ,
M∗t
w∗
)
dWt ; t ≥ 0,
M∗t = max
{
w∗ z, sup
0≤s<t
X∗s
}
; t ≥ 0,
X∗0 = x.
(A.8)
Furthermore, the feedback investment and dividend policies (pi∗t , c∗t ) :=
(
pi∗(X∗t , z∗t ), c∗(X∗t , z∗t )
)
are admissible.
(iv) V(x, z) = Ex
∫ τ
0
e–δt (c
∗
t )1–p
1 – p dt.
We prove these conditions below.
Condition (iii): By construction of pi∗ and c∗, if the processes (X∗t ) and (z∗t ) satisfying (A.8) exist,
then (pi∗t , c∗t ) :=
(
pi∗(X∗t , z∗t ), c∗(X∗t , z∗t )
)
are admissible. To show this, we exploit the property of
the feedback control functions pi∗ and c∗ that was explained in Remark 3.1. Namely, following
these feedback controls, we have that the historical peak of the dividend rate (z∗t ) satisfies z∗t =
M∗t
w∗
for all t ≥ 0, where (M∗t ) is given by
M∗t = max
{
M∗0, max0≤s<tXs
}
; t > 0,
and M∗0 = w∗z0. Therefore, it suffices to show that (A.8) has a unique strong solution. This is a
path-dependent SDE. By Theorem 7 in Section 3 of Chapter 5 of Protter (2005), it suffices to show
that the functionals
G(t,x) := pi∗
(
x(t), 1w∗ max
{
w∗ z, sup
0≤s<t
x(s)
})
and
F(t,x) := c∗
(
x(t), 1w∗ max
{
w∗ z, sup
0≤s<t
x(s)
})
,
defined for t ≥ 0 and for continuous functions x : R+ → R+, are functional Lipschitz in the sense
of Protter (2005). This property follows from the Lipschitz property of the pi∗ and c∗ given in
Lemma A.2 below. In particular, for all t ≥ 0 and continuous functions x and y, we have
|G(t,x) –G(t,y)| ≤ K
[∣∣x(t) – y(t)∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣max
{
w∗ z, sup
0≤s<t
x(s)
}
– max
{
w∗ z, sup
0≤s<t
y(s)
}∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ 2K sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣x(s) – y(s)∣∣.
Thus, G is functional Lipschitz. That F is functional Lipschitz follows similarly.
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Lemma A.2. The functions pi∗(x, z) and c∗(x, z) are Lipschitz on R2+.
Proof. We prove the statement for pi∗; the Lipschitz property of c∗ follows similarly. By (3.23) and
(3.25), we have
pi∗(x, z) = z f
(x
z
)
, (A.9)
in which f is defined by f (w) = pi∗(w, 1). Note that f is continuously twice differentiable on [0,w∗],
and f (w) = Kw for w ≥ w∗, in which K equals
K = – µ
σ2
Uw(w∗)
w∗Uww(w∗)
.
It follows that f has bounded first and second derivatives. Differentiating (A.9) with respect to x
yields ∣∣∣pi∗x(x, z)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣f ′(xz
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
w≥0
∣∣∣f ′(w)∣∣∣ <∞.
Furthermore, by differentiating (A.9) with respect to z, we obtain∣∣∣pi∗z (x, z)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣f(xz
)
– xz f
′
(x
z
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (w∗)22 sup0≤w≤w∗
∣∣∣f ′′(w)∣∣∣ <∞.
To obtain the inequality, we used the fact that, for xz ≥ w∗,
f
(x
z
)
– xz f
′
(x
z
)
= 0,
and that, by Taylor’s approximation,∣∣∣∣f(xz
)
– xz f
′
(x
z
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (w∗)22 sup0≤w≤w∗
∣∣∣f ′′(w)∣∣∣,
for all 0 < xz ≤ w∗. Finally, we deduce that pi∗ is Lipschitz since it has bounded derivatives.
Condition (iv): Define
τˆn = n ∧ τ ∧ inf
{
t > 0 :
∫ t
0
e–δs(pi∗s )2V2x(X∗s , z∗s )ds ≥ n or z∗t ≥ n
}
,
and note that τn → τ a.s. because of continuity of (X∗t , z∗t )t>0. Repeating the argument in the
proof of Lemma A.1 for pi = pi∗, c = c∗, and τn = τˆn yields
V(x, z) = Ex
∫ τˆn
0
e–δt (c
∗
t )1–p
1 – p dt + E
x
(
e–δτˆn V(X∗ˆτn , z
∗ˆ
τn )
)
– Ex
∫ τˆn
0
e–δt
[
1
2σ
2(pi∗)2tVxx + (µpi∗t – c∗t )Vx – δV +
(c∗t )1–p
1 – p
]
dt
– Ex
(∫ τˆn
0
e–δt Vz d(z∗t )c +
∑
0≤t≤τˆn
e–δt
(
V(X∗t , z∗t+) – V(X
∗
t , z∗t )
))
.
(A.10)
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As stated in Remark 3.1 and the discussion that precedes it, the process (z∗t ) defined in (A.8)
can only have a jump at t = 0 and only if x > w∗z. After this possible initial jump, the process
(X∗t , z∗t )t>0 will be kept in the domain D. Because V satisfies the free-boundary problem in (3.2)
and (X∗t , z∗t ) ∈ D for t > 0, we have
Ex
∫ τˆn
0
e–δt
[
1
2σ
2(pi∗)2tVxx + (µpi∗t – c∗t )Vx – δV +
(c∗t )1–p
1 – p
]
dt = 0.
Furthermore, because Vz(x, z) = 0 on R2+ –D and (z∗t ) can only jump at t = 0, we have
Ex
(∫ τˆn
0
e–δt Vz d(z∗t )c +
∑
0≤t≤τˆn
e–δt
(
V(X∗t , z∗t+) – V(X
∗
t , z∗t )
))
= V(x, z∗0+) – V(x, z) = 0.
From (A.10), it then follows that
V(x, z) = Ex
∫ τˆn
0
e–δt (c
∗
t )1–p
1 – p dt + E
x
(
e–δτˆn V(X∗ˆτn , z
∗ˆ
τn )
)
. (A.11)
Next, we prove that
lim infn→∞ E
x
(
e–δτˆnV(X∗ˆτn , z
∗ˆ
τn )
)
= 0. (A.12)
For α = 0, this equation follows from the so-called transversality condition of the value function in
the classical Merton’s problem. By Lemma A.3 below, V decreases as α increases. Thus, (A.12) is
also satisfied for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma A.3. The expression for V in (3.22) and (3.27) decreases with respect to α, and as α
approaches 0, V in (3.22) and (3.27) approaches
x1–p
1 – p
(
κp2
p(1 + κδ) – 1
)p
, (A.13)
for all x ≥ 0, independent of z.
Proof. From Corollary 3.3, we know that Û decreases with α, which implies that U decreases with
α; thus, the expression in (3.22) also decreases with α. To see that the expression in (3.27) when
x > w∗z decreases with α, differentiate to obtain
∂V
∂α
∝ κp
2
p(1 + κδ) – 1 – w
∗,
because w∗ increases with α, as we show in Corollary 4.3 below. This expression is negative for
α ∈ (0, 1) because lim
α→0+w
∗ = κp
2
p(1+κδ)–1 .
Next, if we allow α to approach 0, y∗ approaches 1, wα approaches 0, and w1 and w∗ both
approach κp
2
p(1+κδ)–1 . By substituting these limits in V in (3.22) and (3.27), we obtain the expression
in (A.13).
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Finally, by letting n → ∞ in (A.11) and using V(0, z) = 0, (A.12), and the monotone conver-
gence theorem, we obtain V(x, z) = Ex
∫ τ
0
e–δt (c
∗
t )1–p
1 – p dt.
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